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We present a protocol for deterministic and highly efficient quantum cryptography with entangled pho-
ton pairs in a 4×4-dimentional Hilbert space. Two communicating parties, Alice and Bob first share a both
polarization- and path-entangled photon pair, and then each performs a complete Bell-state measurement
on their own photon in one of two complementary Bell-state bases. It is demonstrated that each measure-
ment in which both Alice and Bob register a photon can build certain perfect correlation and generate 1.5
key bits on average. The security of our protocol is guaranteed by the non-cloning theorem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 42.50.Ar
The central task for quantum cryptography is to establish
secure keys before the transmission of message between
two parties [1]. In recent years, both BB84 [2] and Ek-
ert91 [3] cryptographic protocols have been successfully
demonstrated in numerous experiments [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
However, one drawback of the above schemes is the non-
deterministic feature, that is, only less than 50% of all de-
tected qubits can be further used as key bits. This is a seri-
ous practical problem, because in the one-time-pad secret-
key cryptosystem, the length of secret key must be the same
as the ciphertext [10]. Although some deterministic cryp-
tographic schemes based on orthogonal states have been
proposed recently [11, 12, 13], the long storage rings re-
quired, which is an essential ingredient of those schemes,
lead to a low efficiency for the transmission of polarized
photons. More recently, deterministic quantum cryptog-
raphy and secret direct communication have also been pro-
posed with single-photon two-qubit states [14]. By exploit-
ing the states in four- or more dimensional Hilbert space,
each transmitted photon can be used as a key bit with the
help of classical communication; eavesdroppers can be de-
tected within the scheme. However, every photon detected
can establish only one key bit.
In this work, we propose a deterministic and highly effi-
cient quantum cryptography protocol using doubly entan-
gled photon pairs [15, 16]. In the scheme, two communi-
cating parties, Alice and Bob, first share a polarization- and
path-entangled photon pair, then each performs a complete
Bell measurement on Alice’s (Bob’s) photon in one of two
complementary Bell bases. In this way, they can estab-
lish 1.5 key bits on average for each measurement where
both Alice and Bob register a single photon. We also show
that the security of our protocol is guaranteed by the non-
cloning theorem.
In order to establish a key bit at each run - that is - in
a determinstic way, it would require that, on the one hand,
each assigned joint measurement must generate certain per-
fect correlations between two communicating parties; and
on the other hand, some of these perfect correlations are
sufficient to perform the validation of eavesdropper. Our
quantum cryptography protocol is based on this observa-
tion. Although it is not possible to contruct such a protocol
for two observers with only one Einstein-Poldolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pair, one can indeed achieve this goal using two EPR
pairs, provided that one can achieve the controlled-NOT
operation between two indepedent photons [17].
In our scheme, instead of utilizing two EPR pairs, we
make use of only one photon pair where the two photons
are entangled both in polarization and in path degree of
freedom [16]. In contrast to the two pair scheme, there
are two obvious advantages in our single pair scheme.
First, the required complete Bell-state measurement which
projects Alice’s (Bob’s) photon onto a polarization-path
entangled state in one of two complementary bases is fea-
sible with only linear optics and, actually, has been ex-
perimentally implemented [18]. Second, using two usual
polarization-entangled photon pairs will lead to very low
efficiency due to the very low probability of simultane-
ously generating two entangled photon pairs. Our scheme
is deterministic in the sense that all measurements in which
both Alice and Bob register a photon can be used to estab-
lish perfect correlations, which can then be converted into
key bits and a few of them are enough to perform the de-
tection of any eavesdroppers. Entanglement exploited in
the present scheme is used both to provide security against
eavesdropping and to enhance the key bit generation.
We now explain how our scheme works. As shown
in Fig. 1, two communicating parties, Alice and Bob,
first share a both polarization- and path-entangled photon
pair. It can be generated using parametric down conver-
sion (PDC) by the method described in Ref. [19]. As ex-
plained in refs. [15, 16], after the UV laser passes through
the BBO crystal twice, the state corresponding to the case
where there is one and only one pair production is given by
|Ψ〉
A1B2
=
1
2
(|H〉
1
|V 〉
2
− |V 〉
1
|H〉
2
)
⊗ (|a1〉 |b2〉 − |b1〉 |a2〉) . (1)
Here
|H〉
1
and |V 〉
1
represent the polarization states of photon
1 in path a1 or b1, and |H〉2 and |V 〉2 represent the states
of photon 2 in path a2 or b2. Then let photon 1 in path a1
and b1 move towards Alice and photon 2 in path a2 and b2
towards Bob. With such state Alice and Bob can perform
2FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of generating both polarization- and
path-entangled photon pairs and performing the complete Bell
measurement in one of the two complentary bases. R90 and R45
are half-wave plates that rotating the polarization of photons by
900 and 450 respectively. When inserting R90 into the mode a1
(or b2), Alice (or Bob) can perform the complete Bell-state mea-
surement on the state of
{∣∣Φ±〉
ij
,
∣∣Ψ±〉
ij
}
. When inserting two
450s into the modes a1 and b1 (or a2 and b2) simultaneously, Al-
ice (or Bob) can perform the complete Bell-state measurement on
the state of
{∣∣χ±〉
ij
,
∣∣ω±〉
ij
}
[18].
entanglement swapping [20, 21] or all-versus-nothing test
of quantum mechanics against local realism [16, 17]. In
the following, we are going to show how entanglement
swapping of the quantum state |Ψ〉
A1B2
provides us a
deterministic and efficient quantum cryptography.
In order to establish secure key bits between Alice
and Bob, they can randomly choose one of two com-
plementary Bell-state bases
{
|Φ±〉
ij
, |Ψ±〉
ij
}
(type-I) or{
|χ±〉ij , |ω±〉ij
}
(type-II) (ij = A1 or B2) and then
perform Bell-state measurement. The two Bell-state bases
are defined as following:{ |Φ±〉
ij
= 1√
2
(|H〉
i
|aj〉 ± |V 〉i |bj〉)
|Ψ±〉
ij
= 1√
2
(|H〉
i
|bj〉 ± |V 〉i |aj〉)
, (2)
and{ |χ±〉
ij
= 1
2
[|H〉
i
(|aj〉+ |bj〉)± |V 〉i (|aj〉 − |bj〉)]
|ω±〉
ij
= 1
2
[|V 〉
i
(|aj〉+ |bj〉)± |H〉i (|aj〉 − |bj〉)] .
(3)
The Bell states in the two complementary bases satisfy the
following relations

|Φ±〉
ij
= 1√
2
(
|χ∓〉
ij
± |ω±〉
ij
)
|Ψ±〉
ij
= 1√
2
(
|χ±〉
ij
± |ω∓〉
ij
) , (4)
where |·〉
A1
and |·〉
B2
represent the quantum states to be
measured by Alice and Bob, respectively. Because the Bell
states are polarization and path entangled, the complete
Bell-state measurement can be done with only linear optics
[18]. This feature is essential to our deterministic quantum
cryptography protocol. After the measurements have taken
place, Alice and Bob can announce in public which type
of Bell bases they have used, and then divide the measure-
ments into two sub-groups: For the first group they use the
same Bell bases, and for the second group they use the dif-
ferent Bell bases. Of course, owing to the limited detection
efficiency they only consider those events in which both
Alice and Bob successfully register a single photon.
Let us first consider what will happen when Alice and
Bob use the same Bell bases, i.e., they use either type-I
or type-II Bell base. In this case the state |Ψ〉
A1B2
of Al-
ice and Bob, according to entanglement swapping, can be
rewritten in the two Bell bases as
|Ψ〉
A1B2
=
1
2
(∣∣Φ+〉
A1
∣∣Φ+〉
B2
− ∣∣Φ−〉
A1
∣∣Φ−〉
B2
− ∣∣Ψ+〉
A1
∣∣Ψ+〉
B2
+
∣∣Ψ−〉
A1
∣∣Ψ−〉
B2
)
=
1
2
(− ∣∣χ+〉
A1
∣∣χ+〉
B2
+
∣∣χ−〉
A1
∣∣χ−〉
B2
+
∣∣ω+〉
A1
∣∣ω+〉
B2
− ∣∣ω−〉
A1
∣∣ω−〉
B2
)
. (5)
Eq. (5) implies that, whenever Alice obtain a measure-
ment result, Bob will always obtain the same result as long
as his measurement is performed in the same Bell bases.
Therefore, perfect correlations can be built for those cases
in which both of them perform a measurement on their own
particle in the same Bell bases.
If Alice and Bob use different Bell bases (i.e., type-I and
type-II Bell bases), the total state of Alice and Bob can be
rewritten as either
|Ψ〉
A1B2
=
1
2
√
2
(∣∣Φ+〉
A1
∣∣ω+〉
B2
+
∣∣Φ+〉
A1
∣∣χ−〉
B2
+
∣∣Φ−〉
A1
∣∣ω−〉
B2
− ∣∣Φ−〉
A1
∣∣χ+〉
B2
− ∣∣Ψ+〉
A1
∣∣χ+〉
B2
− ∣∣Ψ+〉
A1
∣∣ω−〉
B2
+
∣∣Ψ−〉
A1
∣∣χ−〉
B2
− ∣∣Ψ−〉
A1
∣∣ω+〉
B2
)
, (6)
or
|Ψ〉
A1B2
=
1
2
√
2
(∣∣Φ+〉
B2
∣∣ω+〉
A1
+
∣∣Φ+〉
B2
∣∣χ−〉
A1
+
∣∣Φ−〉
B2
∣∣ω−〉
A1
− ∣∣Φ−〉
B2
∣∣χ+〉
A1
−
∣∣Ψ+〉
B2
∣∣χ+〉
A1
−
∣∣Ψ+〉
B2
∣∣ω−〉
A1
+
∣∣Ψ−〉
B2
∣∣χ−〉
A1
− ∣∣Ψ−〉
B2
∣∣ω+〉
A1
)
. (7)
The above two equations imply the following: Any spe-
cific outcome obtained by Alice or Bob in one of the two
bases is maximally random and as such, given two specific
outcomes of measurements in one type of the Bell bases
obtained by Alice, she can predict with certainty the two
outcomes of the corresponding measurements performed
by Bob in another Bell bases and vice versa. For example,
whenever Alice obtains one of the two Bell states |Φ+〉 and
|Ψ−〉 (or |Φ−〉 and |Ψ+〉), Bob’s photon will be in one of
the two states |ω+〉 and |χ−〉 (or |ω−〉 and |χ+〉). Thus,
Alice and Bob can always build two kinds of correlations
in different bases.
Since a deterministic correlation can be built for every
joint measurement, all outcomes of the measurements in
the same or different bases can be further used as key bits.
3This is the essential property of our deterministic quantum
cryptography protocol and is different from the existing
schemes with two-dimensional entangled photon pairs.
Having established that deterministic correlations can be
built between two communicating parties, let us show how
to generate the key bits in the present protocol. First, if
Alice and Bob have used the different bases, they can then
simply define the two kinds of correlations as 0 and 1. For
example, in the case of that Alice performs a measurement
in the
{
|Φ±〉ij , |Ψ±〉ij
}
bases and Bob performs a mea-
surement in the
{
|χ±〉ij , |ω±〉ij
}
bases, Alice can define
the two Bell states |Φ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 as 0 and |Φ−〉 and |Ψ+〉
as 1, while Bob can define the two states |ω+〉 and |χ−〉 as
0 and |ω−〉 and |χ+〉 as 1. Thus in this case, one key bit can
be built. Second, if they use the same Bell bases, they actu-
ally receive two bits of deterministic information from the
measurements since there are 4 possible outcomes of mea-
surements in any one of the two Bell bases. They can agree
with each other in advance that the Bell states (|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉,
|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉) and (|χ+〉, |χ−〉, |ω+〉, |ω−〉) are encoded as
two bits 00, 01, 10 and 11. Thus in the latter case, two key
bits can be built. Since the probabilities that Alice and Bob
perform the mesaurement in different Bell bases and in the
same Bell bases are the same, i.e. 50%, every measure-
ment in which both of Alice and Bob register a photon can
establish 1.5 key bits on average. Therefore, by exploit-
ing the high-capacity encoding method, the above scheme
can provide a more efficient quantum cryptography than
the existing deterministic ones.
Let us now discuss the security of the scheme. For sim-
plicity, suppose that an eavesdropper, Eve, has full access
to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, Eve can
thus make use of intercept-resend attack. He can first ran-
domly perform a Bell-state measurement on the photon 2
in the two complementary bases and then send its replace-
ment to Bob. However, when Alice performs a Bell-state
measurement on her photon by randomly choosing one of
the two complementary bases, she equivalently prepares a
mixture of some nonorthogonal states with equal probabil-
ity. Owing to the limit of the non-cloning theorem [22], it is
not possible for Eve to know which basis Alice has chosen.
Indeed, Eve can at most get 50% information, while Alice
and Bob have about 25% error rate in the key bits obtained
[1, 2]. By announcing and comparing in public some out-
comes of the measurements in the same bases, Alice and
Bob can thus easily detect the presence of Eve.
However, Eve can also perform another type of
intercept-resend attack. Eve can first randomly perform
a Bell-state measurement on both photons in one of the
two complementary bases and then send its replacements
to Alice and Bob, respectively. In this case, since any mea-
surement performed by Eve will destroy the original en-
tanglement between the two photons, the measurement re-
sults obtained by Alice and Bob during the verifictaion of
entanglement swapping will be inconsistent with the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics. Specifically, by compar-
ing the outcome of the measurement in the same Bell-state
bases, in a single run Alice and Bob will detect the eaves-
dropper with the probability of 1/4whenever Eve performs
the Bell measurements in the same Bell bases and with the
probability of 1/2 whenever Eve performs the Bell mea-
surements in the different bases. By announcing and com-
paring in public some outcomes of the measurements in
the same bases, again Alice and Bob can easily detect the
presence of Eve.
As pointed out in Ref. [16], the state |Ψ〉
A1B2
used
in our protocol is effectively a maximally entangled state
in a 4×4-dimensional Hilbert space. Essentially, the
scheme presented here is thus a high-dimensional quan-
tum cryptography protocol. In contrast to the former
high-dimensional quantum cryptography protocols where
the protocols provide better security against eavesdropping
than the low-dimensional ones while lead to a low gen-
eration rate of key bits [23, 24, 25, 26, 27], our protocol
not only provides better security against eavesdropping but
also has a higher generation rate of key bits than the low-
dimensional ones.
Compared with Ekert’s quantum cryptography protocol
using EPR-entangled qubit states [3], a striking feature
of the present scheme is its higher efficiency. In Ekert’s
scheme, in order to be against eavesdropping, Alice and
Bob randomly perform statistical measurements and reg-
ister the outcomes in one of three nonorthogonal bases.
When they have used the same bases incidentally, the re-
sults are correlated or anticorrelated and can be converted
into key bits. For the others the results is not correlated and
therefore used only for checking whether there is eaves-
dropper with help of Bell’s inequalities. Thus, the overall
probability of creating a key bit is 2/9 per pair. However,
in our scheme each measurement in which both of Alice
and Bob register a photon simultaneously can generate 1.5
key bits on average. Thus, the key bit generation efficiency
per pair is 27/4 times higher in our scheme than in Akert’s.
In summary, we have presented a protocol for determin-
istic and efficient quantum cryptography with two photons
that are entangled in both polarization and path degrees of
freedom. The protocol can establish 1.5 key bits per en-
tangled pair, which is almost one order of magnitude (∼ 7
times) higher than the Akert’s scheme and is completely
secure against eavesdropping. The polarization- and path-
entangled photon pairs [19] and the complete Bell-state
measurement [18] are two basic ingredients of the pro-
posed protocol. Thus, our scheme is feasible and within
the reach of current technology. The experimental realiza-
tion of the protocol is under way in our lab.
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